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Abstract
This paper aims at giving a theoretical background to the, some-
times observed, puzzling inverse correlation between the degree of de-
centralization and economic growth. We provide evidence that there
is some interaction between decentralization and corruption in ex-
plaining growth. Within an endogenous growth model, we analyze
the problem of a benevolent central government trying to determine
the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization. Specifically, it can pro-
duce a public good directly, but inefficiently, or it can delegate some
(or all) of the production to more efficient local bureaucrats. In the
latter case, however, some resources will be wasted because of corrup-
tion and the costs linked to monitoring expenditures. With respect to
the benchmark case, then, the possibility of corruption yields both a
distorted allocation of resources (insufficient decentralization) and an
overall under provision of the public good.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis that has been propagating through the world economy
since the summer of 2007, and the apparent limitations of monetary policy,
brought fiscal policy to the forefront of the economic policy debate. Virtu-
ally all the countries of the G20 group designed, in the winter of 2008-09,
important stimulus packages aimed at sustaining aggregate demand. Most
countries, like the US, China, and the largest eurozone economies, gave prior-
ity to investment in infrastructures or in human capital, so as to reduce debt
sustainability issues and to enhance complementarity with private capital. In
some cases, the mobilization of such a large amount of resources has revived
the fear of rent seeking and resource misuse, especially from local government
officials. The Chinese stimulus plan (see Wong 2011 for details), for example,
raised the issue of coordination between the central government input and
the implementation by provinces and town leaders. During the discussion on
the implementation of the plan party officials have been quoted as saying:
“What people hate most is that local governments usually sing a different
tune from central policies during implementation. Central government poli-
cies could sometimes be used by some at grassroots to seek personal gains.
We’ve learnt grave lessons from and paid dearly for similar cases.” (China
Daily 2009). While not limited to them (see e.g. The Economist 2009), this
problem is particularly felt in large emerging countries, where size makes
it necessary to pass through local governments to efficiently provide pub-
lic goods. From private conversations we gathered the information that the
already impressive Chinese stimulus plan ($585bn, accounting for 7% of Chi-
nese GDP, over the two years 2009-2010) could have been even larger in size,
were it not for the doubts of the central government about its capacity to
limit rent seeking and corruption during the program implementation at the
local level.
Yet, a casual look at the literature is sufficient to realize that the relation-
ship between corruption, decentralization and growth is more controversial
than one would expect, and that the debate is still unsettled (remaining
within the previous discussion, see for example Zhang and Zou 1998 and
Jin, Qian, and Weingast 2005 for contrasting results referring to Chinese
provinces). While the generally poor quality of data on decentralization and
corruption may be one source of inconclusiveness, we will argue that taking
into account the interaction between the efficiency gains of decentralization
and rent seeking may go a long way in explaining the apparent lack of ro-
bustness of the relationship. To look into this issue we start from our own,
somewhat puzzling, empirical evidence. First, we find the robust result that
more corrupt countries tend to be more centralized. Then, we observe that,
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contrary to most of the empirical literature, corruption is not significant once
it enters into a growth regression together with decentralization. This seems
to suggest that one channel through which corruption affects growth is its
effect on the decision to delegate power to subnational governments. In other
words, as the fear of Chinese government officials demonstrates, the existence
of corruption may lead to suboptimal allocation of public spending between
central and local governments.
This paper is an attempt to make sense of the empirical puzzle. We
try to do this in the simplest possible framework, developing an endogenous
growth model with the services of public capital, as in Barro (1990) in which
a benevolent central government is confronted with the choice of providing
a public good directly, but somewhat inefficiently, or delegating its provision
to a local government that is more efficient while potentially corrupt. In such
a simple setting, the possibility of corruption generates a distorted allocation
of expenditure between levels of government, as well as an overall provision
of the public good that is lower than the benchmark optimal level, as yielded
by the model of Barro.
Furthermore, the model may shed light on the role of political centraliza-
tion in determining the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization. It’s generally
accepted that the Chinese experience of fiscal decentralization in seventies
and eighties was an overall success, while that of Russia in the early nineties
a failure. Among the many explanations advanced, Blanchard and Shleifer
(2001) emphasize differences in the degree of political centralization between
these two countries. The single-party system in China implied that local
bureaucrats were often appointed by the central authorities and generally
lacked a strong local powerbase. In Russia, on the other hand, the wave of
economic and political reforms of the early nineties produced a number of
territorial cleavages with regional governors being elected and often having
political affiliations drastically different from that of the central government.1
Thus, it may be argued that fiscal decentralizations in China and Russia
happened against very different political backgrounds with Chinese local bu-
reaucrats not necessarily being less corruptible, but much more accountable
to the center than their Russian counterparts. Our model can capture this
phenomenon via the parameter that measures the costliness of monitoring of
local bureaucrats by the central government.
The outline of the paper is as follows: the next section reviews the re-
lated literature on federalism, corruption and growth. Section 3 presents the
1An extreme example of this phenomenon was the emergence of the so-called ”red belt”
of (mostly Central-European) regions where local political elites openly supported (and
often belonged to) the Communist Party. Note that this argument is not unchallenged,
see Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b), p. 184.
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empirical results that motivate the paper, and highlights the link between
corruption and decentralization in explaining growth. Section 4 introduces
a simple and standard endogenous growth model, and derives the results on
public good provision in the presence of bureaucratic corruption. We show
that even within this simple setting, once we consider the choice to decen-
tralize in conjunction with rent seeking, it is possible explain the somewhat
puzzling results of section 3. Section 5 concludes and gives suggestions for
future research.
2 Related literature
The foundations of fiscal federalism theory have been laid in seminal work by
Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972)2. The main result of the early strands of
literature states that the central government should provide all public goods
for which there is no heterogeneity of preferences across jurisdictions, and
those for which it is impossible for local governments to properly target the
users (due for example to the mobility of the tax base and/or of the benefi-
ciaries). On the other hand, decentralization is optimal when heterogeneity
of preferences (or production costs) over public goods exists across regions,
together with the capacity of local governments to provide them. In that
case, the provision of public goods by local governments can be tailored to
the demand of their constituencies, thus improving welfare over uniform pro-
vision by the central government. This is in essence the ”Decentralization
Theorem” (Oates 1972), whose validity relies nevertheless on a number of
conditions, the most important being the absence of externalities. If the
effects of local public good provision spill over the boundaries of the ju-
risdiction, a trade-off emerges between the uniform provision of the public
good by the central government, that internalizes the externality but loses
the capacity to equate marginal costs and revenues for citizens in differ-
ent jurisdictions, and the provision by the local government, tailored to the
needs of local citizens but unable to take into account the externality. The
trade-off between heterogeneity and externalities remains central in the more
recent work on the subject, based on asymmetric information and incomplete
contracts (Seabright 1996). The second assumption of the Decentralization
Theorem is that the central government can only provide a uniform level
of the public good across jurisdictions, i.e. that it is unable to tailor the
2A second important branch of the literature on fiscal federalism, initiated by Tiebout
(1956), focuses on the competition between different jurisdictions, and on the effects on
the overall efficiency of government action. As we focus on the relationship between the
central government and a unique local government, we do not discuss this literature.
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provision of the public good to local preferences. This assumption is usually
justified on theoretical grounds by an informational advantage of local gov-
ernments, who are closer to their constituencies, and as a consequence have
a knowledge of local preferences. Following Oates’ seminal contribution, a
wide literature, theoretical and empirical alike, has investigated the links be-
tween decentralization, efficiency, and growth, with empirical results being
rather inconclusive overall (see Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003, who also
provide an overview of the different channels through which growth and de-
centralization can affect each other). Reviewing this literature goes beyond
the scope of our paper.
Our work departs from Oates’ framework in that the level of public good
provided by the central and the local governments need not differ, which
allows us to focus on a single region, and to neglect heterogeneities. Never-
theless, we retain the classic idea that the local government has a knowledge
of local conditions that the central government lacks. As a consequence,
while part of the central government effort is wasted (implicitly assuming
that it bears the cost of monitoring the needs of local constituencies), the
local bureaucrats are perfectly efficient in providing the public good. An
alternative interpretation of our framework (in the spirit of Breton and Scott
1978) could be that the signaling costs associated with centralization are
larger than the administrative costs associated with decentralization, so that
local governments are ceteris paribus more efficient.
As most of the literature on growth and public expenditure, we build on
the seminal endogenous growth model by Barro (1990) which uses a constant
returns to scale production function incorporating public sector services as
an input to private production. Under the assumption of tax-financed public
services (i.e. of a balanced government budget), a trade-off appears: the
increase in taxes reduces investment and growth, whereas the increase in
public services raises it through capital productivity increases. The second
effect dominates when government size is small, but the negative effect of
taxes on investment and growth eventually becomes more important as the
size of government increases. We introduce a specific production function for
the public good, which takes inputs from the local and from the central gov-
ernment. This production function is specified so as to yield Barro’s baseline
result as a special case.
While more efficient, the local government may be corrupt, i.e. it may
engage in rent seeking activities. A very large body of economic research
has been undertaken with the aim of understanding the sources and conse-
quences of corruption, which can be broadly defined as illegal profit-seeking
activity of bureaucrats trying to exploit their public-sector positions. Early
theoretical models typically focused on establishing the microfoundations of
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the relationship between governments and bureaucrats (e.g. Rose-Ackerman
1978, Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Banerjee 1997, Carrillo 2000) focusing on
the role of government structure, information and incentives in creating and
preventing corrupt activities. A common feature of many of these models is
the presence of a cost of monitoring the public officials/bureaucrats, whose
actions cannot be perfectly observed; this results in the government and the
bureaucrats being involved in a principal-agent type relationship.3 Here we
do not develop this aspect of the relationship between the different levels of
governments, but take as given rent seeking (attenuated by monitoring) by
the local government.
Barreto (2000) embeds the rent seeking formalization of Shleifer and
Vishny (1993) into a neoclassical growth model, where corruption is an en-
dogenous result of competition between public and private agents. In his
model corruption may be growth enhancing if it allows for the elimination
of red-tape. Interestingly enough, even in highly developed countries such as
the U.S. the negative correlation between (regional) growth and corruption is
significant as the recent study by Johnson, LaFountain, and Yamarik (2011)
demonstrates. Yet, the evidence is less conclusive than one would expect (see
the recent surveys of Svensson 2005 and Aidt 2009). In most of the literature
the growth rate is reduced by corruption, either because it affects private
investment (Mauro 1995), or because it leads to over-investment in public
capital (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Keefer and Knack 2007). A small body
of literature finds nevertheless evidence in favour of the so-called ”greasing
the wheel” hypothesis, by which in systems with dysfunctional institutions
corruption may actually increase efficiency and growth, by helping overcome
red tape and public sector inefficiencies.4
In this paper, we focus on the effects on public capital and growth of
the interaction between a rent-seeking local government and a benevolent
central government. This interaction may actually yield under-investment
in public capital, similar to the suboptimal provision of insurance in stan-
dard textbook examples. In a work related to our own, but more focused
on the principal-agent relationship, Besfamille (2004) shows that when lo-
cal governments collude with contractors to extract rent from the central
government, that may result either in excessive costs of project, or in un-
3This basic principle-agent framework was later incorporated in several papers (see for
instance Ehrlich and Lui 1999, Sarte 2000 and Blackburn, Bose, and Haque 2006) that
studied corruption and growth in a dynamic general equilibrium context.
4The greasing-the-wheel hypothesis is used to explain the so-called Asian paradox, by
which in a number of fast growing East-Asian countries we observe positive correlation
between corruption and growth, even once institutions are taken into account (see e.g.
Rock and Bonnett 2004; Li and Wu 2007; Vial and Hanoteau 2010).
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der(over)provision of valuable(useless) projects. Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2005) study how political capture on both levels of government, coupled
with corruption at the central level, may lead to different optimal levels of
decentralization, depending on the level of poverty of regions. Another study
related to our work, by Brueckner (2000), identifies a possible trade-off be-
tween fiscal decentralization, associated with better satisfaction of hetero-
geneous public-good demands, and regional (subnational) corruption which
increases the cost of public-good provision. Fiscal decentralization becomes
welfare-improving only when corruption-related loss is small enough not to
offset the benefit of better tailoring the supply to local needs. His work
focuses on the allocation of spending between the different layers of govern-
ment, neglecting the total amount of public goods provision and its effects
on the growth rate of the economy.
3 Evidence
This section presents empirical evidence on the relationship between decen-
tralization, corruption and growth. Our results show a negative impact of
corruption on the degree of fiscal decentralization and, through this, on eco-
nomic growth. Yet, we must warn the reader that this evidence can only be
taken as suggestive due to the quality of data on decentralization and, espe-
cially, corruption. We will ask two questions. The first is whether there is a
link between corruption and the degree of decentralization. And the answer
will be that it exists and it is negative. The second is whether decentraliza-
tion and corruption play a role in an otherwise standard growth equation.
The answer will be that they do but only when included separately.
3.1 Data and Variables Description
Most of our macroeconomic and financial data were taken from the World
Bank Global Development Finance (GDF) and World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) datasets5. We augmented these with data on corruption and
political institutions taken from the dataset assembled by Enikolopov and
Zhuravskaya (2007). Given the severe lack of data on corruption and fiscal
decentralization for many countries, most of our variables are measured as
averages over the 1997-2001 period. Table 1 gives the exact definition and
sources of all the variables used in our econometric analysis. The Trans-
parency International ’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a widely uti-
lized index of corruption that uses the scale from 1 (highly corrupt) to 10
5Accessed on line: http://databank.worldbank.org
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(least corrupt). As stated by its creators, the CPI ranks almost 200 countries
“by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments
and opinion surveys”. As such, it suffers from the common drawbacks of
indexes constructed using surveys, namely arbitrariness and difficulties in
interpreting year-to-year changes. This is why, consistently with the devel-
opers’ original intention, we took it as a simple cross-sectional snapshot over
the 1997-2001 time period.
3.2 Corruption and the Degree of Decentralization
Table 2 presents the results for the effect of corruption on decentralization.
Our first specification used as controls a set of standard factors affecting
decentralization, such as country size (proxied by the population size) and
openness. The second specification expands the set of controls to account
for the role of political institutions that could potentially affect the degree
of decentralization. Finally, in specification (3), we added a set of dummy
variables denoting countries’ legal origin. These are all standard controls used
in regressions on decentralization. Each specification includes the corruption
variable, constructed as 10 minus the CPI discussed above.
The estimations show that countries with higher corruption levels tend
to be less decentralized. This is already apparent in the basic regression and
is robust to the introduction of additional controls in specifications (2) and
(3).
A further check of robustness of our results consisted in restricting the
sample to the OECD countries, more homogeneous in terms of development
and corruption. The results are reported in table 3 where we ran the same
regressions as in table 2.6 The results confirm our findings of the effect of
corruption on decentralization obtained using the full sample. The estimated
coefficient of corruption is negative and significant in all specifications. Coun-
try size and openness, having a greater in absolute value coefficent of corre-
lation in the OECD subsample than in the full sample (−0.48 vs. −0.18),
are jointly insignificant (we kept them for comparison with Table 2).
To summarize, conditional to the quality of our dataset, we are able to
document a robust relationship between the degree of corruption and the
share of subnational government expenditure.
6In specification (3’) we drop the dummy variable for the socialist legal origin as it does
not concern any of the OECD countries.
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3.3 The Effect of Corruption and Decentralization on
Growth
Next we investigated the effect of corruption and decentralization in an oth-
erwise standard growth equation. We restricted our sample to include all
countries (43) for which we had comparable data on controls (specifically,
the public debt variable) and the two exogenous variables of interest (cor-
ruption and subnational expenditure).
We chose to regress average growth from 2001 to 2007 (i.e. before the on-
set of the crisis ), on corruption and subnational expenditure, together with
a number of standard controls, at the beginning of the period. More specifi-
cally, we averaged the control variables over the four years period 1997-2001.
In other words, we investigated the overall performance of the economy over
the early years 2000, using as explanatory variables a snapshot of relevant
factors at the beginning of the period. This approach has the disadvantage of
not capturing short term co-movement between the variables, and does not
necessarily rule out the problem of endogeneity; but, in our opinion, when in-
vestigating the role of slow-moving institutional variables, it better captures
intrinsically long-term relationships. We furthermore opted for a simple cross
sectional analysis, rather than using a panel, because data limitations would
not allow going sufficiently back in time.
Table 4 reports the regression results. In specification (1) average growth
of GDP per capita is regressed on a set of standard control variables (ini-
tial GDP, openness, public debt over GDP) and on subnational expenditure.
All the controls yield the expected signs (openness positively affects growth,
while initial GDP and public debt have a negative impact), and are signifi-
cant. Taken alone, decentralization also has the expected impact: delegating
spending to local governments increases efficiency and growth.
In the second specification we replace the decentralization variable with
corruption. Following Swaleheen (2011), we added a square term to capture
possibly non-linear effects of corruption on growth. The control variables
keep the expected signs, and corruption, also as expected, has a statistically
significant negative impact on growth (with a p− value of 0.061). The non
linear-term, while it substantially improves the goodness of fit, has a small
coefficient value, and in the relevant range for corruption (Corrupt ∈ [0, 10])
it is dominated by the linear term.
Finally, in specification (3), we tested the joint impact of the two vari-
ables on growth. The estimated coefficient on subnational expenditure is
positive, while both corruption terms become insignificant. This, taken to-
gether with the results of Table 2, provides support for our theoretical result
that corruption affects growth through changes in the optimal degree of fiscal
9
decentralization.
It is interesting to observe that, as could be expected, these results are
driven primarily by non-OECD countries. If we restrict the sample to OECD
countries, the results become inconclusive (The regression results are avail-
able upon request).
Our empirical results show first, that corrupt countries should be more
fiscally centralized, i.e. ceteris paribus, corruption and the share of subna-
tional government expenditure should be negatively correlated. Then, our
regressions suggest that decentralization and growth are positively correlated,
while corruption seems to impact growth mostly through its impact on the
degree of decentralization.
We then need to specify our theoretical model in order to obtain the
normative prediction that decentralization positively impact growth, and the
positive implication that higher corruption leads to lower decentralization
which in turn leads to lower growth. Our objective is to obtain these results
in the simplest possible model.
4 The Model
In this paper, the interaction between the central government and local bu-
reaucrats, more efficient but potentially capable of extracting rent from the
provision of public goods, happens against the background of an endogenous
growth model in which the services of public capital enter together with pri-
vate capital as an input to production. We ask two questions: the first is
whether the trade-off between rent seeking of local bureaucrats and ineffi-
ciency of the central government alters the composition of the public good
production, i.e., the shares of local and central government. The second
question is whether this trade-off alters the level of total public good provi-
sion, with respect to the benchmark represented by the original Barro (1990)
model. Our model is based on the interaction of the three types of agents:
1. The central government, whose objective is to provide a public good
that is necessary for production, and which is financed through taxa-
tion.
2. Local bureaucrats, prone to corruption but more efficient than the gov-
ernment in the production of the public good.
3. A private sector that produces and accumulates capital subject to the
constraints imposed by taxation, and to the positive externalities re-
sulting from the provision of the public good.
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The private sector in this model remains in the background. We consider
a simplified version of Barro’s (1990) endogenous growth model with capital
and the services of public capital (the ‘public good’ hereafter) being the only
productive factors:
y = Ak1−αgα (1)
As in Barro, we assume the budget of the government to be always bal-
anced, so that the production of the public good is financed exclusively by
tax receipts. Let τ and θ = τy denote the proportional tax rate and the
total of tax receipts respectively. As the production function is standard, the
growth maximizing level of taxation will be equal to the share of government
services in output. Assume that a representative household has standard
CRRA preferences
max
∫
∞
0
c1−σt
1− σe
−ρtdt s.t.
k˙t = (1− τ)yt − ct
where ρ is the rate of time preference, and σ is the intertemporal rate of
substitution (we assume no depreciation). Standard maximization yields the
textbook decentralized solution:
γ ≡ c˙
c
=
1
σ
(MPK − ρ)
where the marginal product of capital is
MPK = (1− τ)(1− α)Ak−αgα (2)
As in Barro, this model exhibits no transitional dynamics, and wel-
fare/utility maximization is obtained when the growth rate is maximized.
Maximization of the growth rate by the central government is equivalent to
finding an overall level of public good provision g, and the corresponding tax
rate τ , such that MPK is maximized.
4.1 The Production Function for the Public Good
We structure our model in a sort of a principal-agent setting. The central
government, the principal, has the choice of providing the good directly (gc),
which creates inefficiencies, or transferring some funds to the potentially
corrupt local bureaucrats, who produce the good (gl) more efficiently but
may, at the same time, appropriate some of the transferred resources. The
production function of the public good is assumed to be non-homothetic, so
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that g can be produced by the local government, or by both levels jointly.
The function can be written in implicit form as
g =
√(
gc
ψ
+ g
)
gl (3)
where ψ ≥ 1. The explicit form of this function has a linear term in gl and a
concave term
g =
1
2
gl +
1
2
√
g2l +
4gcgl
ψ
This ad hoc formulation serves our main objective of having standard iso-
quants, while simultaneously allowing for corner solutions with only one fac-
tor (gl) used in production. Furthermore, we design it to yield (as a special
case with no corruption) the standard optimal-provision-of-public-goods re-
sult of the Barro model. Our results nevertheless do not depend on this
particular form; in appendix B we show that any sufficiently well-behaved
version of equation (3) produces the same qualitative conclusions on the effect
of corruption on the composition and the size of government spending.
The parameter ψ can be interpreted as a measure of efficiency of gc in the
production of g. This is better understood by computing the marginal rate
of substitution between gc and gl.
MRTS(gc for gl) =
∂g/∂gc
∂g/∂gl
=
2gl√
ψ2g2l + 4ψgcgl + ψgl + 2gc
which is decreasing in ψ indicating that, for a given level of g, a smaller
amount of gl can be given up if one additional unit of gc becomes available.
Thus, higher values of ψ are associated with smaller relative efficiency of gc.
In other words, ψ can be interpreted as the ”efficiency loss” associated with
using gc in the production of the public good g. Figure 1 shows the isoquants
corresponding to different values of ψ. It can be observed that as ψ increases
the isoquants become flatter. Notice further that all the isoquants intersect
the gl axis which implies that the production of g can take place with gl alone;
in that case, as equation (3) shows, production becomes linear: g = gl.
We now turn to the characterization of each agent’s problem.
4.2 Local Government
Given the amount of transfers t received from the central government, local
bureaucrats decide on the amount gl ≤ t that they will actually spend on
the provision of public goods. We assume that local bureaucrats are funda-
mentally corrupt, and that they try to divert funds from public spending.
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Figure 1: Isoquants for the production of g = 5 (ψ = 1, 5, 10)
The relationship between different levels of government and corruption has
been extensively studied (see for instance, Tanzi 1998; Martinez-Vazquez and
McNab 2003; and Gurgur and Shah 2005). Theoretically, decentralization
may be seen to increase the level of corruption (through the proliferation of
spending decisions and the blurring of administration and political roles), or
to decrease it (through increased transparency and proximity to constituen-
cies and hence accountability). In this paper we assume that the former
effect dominates (as in Dalgic and Long 2006), and that the utility function
of local bureaucrats is linear in the amount of transfers diverted from local
spending. Thus, for a given transfer t the net rent of local bureaucrats (t−gl)
is maximized subject to the constraint that an excessive amount of stealing
increases the probability p of being caught. We assume that p monotonically
decreases in the ratio of gl to t, and that when caught, the payoff of local
bureaucrats becomes zero, therefore, their problem can be written as
max
gl
(p · 0 + (1− p)(t− gl)) s.t.
p(gl, t) = β
(
1− gl
t
)
where p is the probability of being caught, and β is a function of the efficiency
of monitoring the local provision of public goods. The value of the parameter
β is taken as given by local officials, but as will be clear below, it is determined
by the expenditure on monitoring and transfers of the central government.
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The solution to the problem is given by
gl = t− t
2β
(4)
The larger is the value of β, the lower will be the rent extraction by local
bureaucrats, i.e. for a given amount of transfers, gl will be higher. In equation
(4), gl ≥ 0 requires β to be bounded from below: β ∈ [12 ,∞).
4.3 The Central Government
The central government maximizes the growth rate of the economy, γ, sub-
ject to the technological constraints (for the production of y and of g), an
incentive compatibility constraint that avoids excessive stealing by the local
government, and the standard balanced budget constraint. Central to our
model, we assume that while corrupt, local bureaucrats are more efficient
in the provision of public goods. We share this assumption with the early
literature on decentralization while being aware of the existence of much
more nuanced theoretical models (see for instance Bardhan and Mookherjee
2006a). It is also useful to keep in mind that some recent applied work pro-
vided empirical support for this argument. For example, Alderman (2002),
using data from the poverty alleviation program in Albania, finds that local
authorities often possess (for example through surveys) information that is
not readily available to the central government and which can be used to
better allocate program funds in their jurisdictions. Using the natural ex-
periment provided by the Bolivian decentralization reform of 1994, Faguet
(2004) shows that the substantial transfer of power to municipalities signif-
icantly altered the sectoral composition of public investment because local
authorities were able to tailor public funds to the different needs of their
constituencies.
Within this framework, the central government has to make three inter-
related choices:
1. Choose the overall tax rate τ , and consequently, given all the con-
straints, the amount of public good produced g.
2. Determine the portion of its tax receipts θ, to be allocated to the direct
production of g via gc, with the remaining resources being transferred
to local bureaucrats:
θ = θc + θl,
with θc and θl denoting the portions of tax receipts allocated to central-
ized and decentralized production respectively. Since we assume that
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there is no corruption among the central government officials, all of the
resources allocated to central government spending translate into the
central government input to the production of the public good. On the
other hand, some leakage due to corruption appears when delegating
to local bureaucrats the provision of the good:
gl < θl
gc = θc
Choosing the allocation of resources between central and local levels of
government is equivalent to deciding the degree of decentralization, i.e.
gc/g and gl/g.
3. Finally, the central government has to minimize rent seeking and ap-
propriation by local bureaucrats; this is done through allocation of
the resources devoted to local production between monitoring, m and
transfers to the local government, t :
θl = m+ t,
We assume that β, and hence the probability of catching the local
bureaucrats who steal from the transfers, depend linearly on the ratio
m/t :
β = δ
m
t
(5)
The efficiency of the monitoring technology is captured by the param-
eter δ, that will be central in our subsequent analysis. This parameter
can also be interpreted as the extent of political centralization thereby
indicating that, ceteris paribus, more politically centralized government
structures will be better at detecting corruption at the subnational
level.
To summarize, the central government’s problem can be represented as:
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max
τ,m,t,gc
γ s.t.
γ =
1
σ
(
(1− τ)(1 − α)Ak−αgα − ρ)
g =
√
(
gc
ψ
+ g)gl
θ = m+ t+ gc
gl = t− t
2β
β = δ
m
t
To solve the problem we proceed backwards:
• First, the central government has to decide how much to spend on
monitoring (m) and on transfers to the local government (t), in order
to maximize spending by the local bureaucrats gl for a given total
amount of resources allotted to decentralized production, θl.
• Next, for a given total amount of the public good g, the government
has to determine the optimal (cost minimizing) allocation between gl
and gc.
• Finally, the government has to decide the total amount of the public
good g that maximizes the growth rate of the economy.
4.3.1 The choice of m and t
We start by finding the optimal allocation of given funds allotted to decen-
tralized production, between transfers and monitoring. From the monitoring
technology equation (5), and the local government optimal choice (equation
4), we can write
gl = t− 1
2
t2
mδ
The allocation of resources between transfers and monitoring can then be
determined through the solution to the following problem:
max
m,t
(
t− 1
2
t2
mδ
)
s.t.
(6)
m+ t = θl
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Problem (6) yields the following solution for t and m :
t = θl
√
2δ + 1− 1√
2δ + 1
m =
θl√
2δ + 1
Notice that since β = δm/t, any value of δ > 0 is compatible with our
prior constraint that β ≥ 1/2 which we had to assume in order to ensure the
non-negativity of gl (see equation 4). Notice also that we do not explicitly
model the incentives faced by the central government in dealing with the the
local government agency problem. We simply assume that it faces a tradeoff
between excessive rent-seeking and waste of resources for monitoring7.
Computing the amount of local government spending is then straightfor-
ward:
gl =
(1 + δ)
√
2δ + 1− 2δ − 1
δ
√
2δ + 1
θl
We can actually define the amount of wasted resources induced by corruption
(whether directly through rent seeking, or indirectly through the cost of
monitoring): define φ as the ratio of actual spending to the local government’s
contribution to public good production:
φ ≡ θl
gl
=
δ
√
2δ + 1
(1 + δ)
√
2δ + 1− 2δ − 1
A value of φ in excess of 1 can be interpreted as the ”corruption loss”,
and it only depends (negatively) on the efficiency of monitoring δ. Further-
more, as δ increases, φ tends to 1 (figure 2). In other words, as the efficiency
of monitoring increases, the ratio of actual spending to the local govern-
ment’s contribution to public good production, θl
gl
, converges to 1 (and the
corresponding corruption loss converges to zero).
In what follows, it will be convenient to think of φ as the determinant of
the amount of resources necessary to obtain gl, i.e., θl = φgl. Remember on
the other hand that no leakage appears in the case of centralized production
(θc = gc).
7For example, as gl and t are observable, we should have punishment of the local govern-
ment each time gl < t is observed. To make the model into a fully fledged principal-agent
relationship we could introduce a non observable leakage in the transfer. The qualitative
results would not be different.
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Figure 2: Corruption loss, φ, as a function of monitoring efficiency δ.
4.3.2 Choice of gl and gc for a given g
Let’s now turn to the problem of determining the local and central inputs gl
and gc necessary to obtain a given amount of the public good g, given the
concave ”technology” defined in equation (3) that allows for possible corner
solutions.
g =
√(
gc
ψ
+ g
)
gl
The government thus faces a choice between the loss in efficiency implied
by centralized production (captured by the parameter ψ), and the ”leakage”
caused by corruption in case of decentralized production (captured by φ).
This trade-off can be represented as a cost minimization problem
min
gl,gc
(θl + θc) = φgl + gc s.t.
g =
√(
gc
ψ
+ g
)
gl
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We then obtain the following solution (see appendix A):
ψ < φ⇒
{
gl =
√
ψ
φ
g
gc =
(√
φψ − ψ) g
(7)
ψ 1 φ⇒
{
gl = g
gc = 0
If the relative efficiency of gc decreases (larger ψ), or monitoring efficiency
increases (smaller φ) then gc will decrease and gl will increase. A more
effective monitoring implies a larger share of spending by the more efficient
local government. Notice also that the existence of an efficiency loss ψ implies
that the central government may decide to provide the public good entirely
through the local government (if ψ ≥ φ). Equation (7) embeds the first of the
results we were looking for: an increase in corruption (or lower monitoring
efficiency) yield a lower share of local government in the provision of the
public good.
4.3.3 The Determination of the Optimal Amount of g
The final step is to determine the optimal level of public spending g, and to
relate it to the overall effectiveness of public spending, where ”effectiveness”
has to be understood in the broad sense of comprising the corruption loss
resulting from the rent seeking behavior of local bureaucrats (φ), and/or the
technical inefficiency of the central government (ψ). From equation (7) we
can compute the total amount of taxes collected θ as:
θ = θl + θc = φgl + gc = λg
where
gc = 0⇒ λ = φ (8a)
gc 6= 0⇒ λ = 2
√
ψφ− ψ (8b)
Since the amount of taxes collected is a proportion τ of total income
(θ = τy), we can further write
g =
θ
λ
=
τy
λ
=
τAk1−αgα
λ
(9)
g = k
(
τA
λ
)1/(1−α)
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Remember from equation (2) that the after tax marginal product of capi-
tal isMPK = (1−τ)(1−α)Ak−αgα, that given equation (9) can be rewritten
as
MPK = (1− τ)(1− α)A1/(1−α)
(τ
λ
)α/(1−α)
This is equivalent to the standard textbook formulation of Barro (1990),
with the exception of the λ term, capturing the burden represented by cen-
tral government inefficiency and corruption losses. The central government’s
problem, therefore, becomes to choose τ such that the MPK is maximized.
This yields the following first-order condition:
d(MPK)
dτ
= A
1
1−α
(α− τ)
τ
(τ
λ
) α
1−α
= 0
which gives the familiar condition for maximizing the growth rate of the
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Figure 3: Relation between tax rate and growth for different values of λ. λ = 1
corresponds to the Barro benchmark. The optimal tax rate τ ∗ = α(= 0.4) is
independent of λ. We assumed A = 10, α = 0.4, σ = 1, ρ = 0.
economy:
τ ∗ = α (10)
Thus, the optimal tax rate is equal to the level obtained in the benchmark,
and is not affected by the existence of efficiency and corruption losses. The
hump-shaped relationship between τ and γ, familiar from Barro, is depicted
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in figure 3. The corruption/efficiency burden does not affect the tax rate,
but it has an effect on the growth rate of the economy.
To solve for the optimal government spending g, we use equations (10)
and (9):
g∗ = k
(
αA
λ
)1/(1−α)
(11)
g∗
y
=
α
λ
Remember that in Barro (1990) g∗/y = α. Thus, to compare our results
to this benchmark, we have to look into the value of λ, defined in equation
(8). In the case of excessive inefficiency of the central government, and/or of
low corruption losses, production is carried on only by the local government,
and equation (8a) shows that λ = φ ≥ 1. In the case of an interior solution,
requiring φ > ψ, we have λ = 2
√
ψφ − ψ (equation 8b). Even in this case,
then, φ > ψ implies λ > 1. Thus,
λ > 1⇒ g
∗
y
=
α
λ
< α
We can conclude that whether the public good is provided by the central gov-
ernment, or by the local government, its level will fall short of what it would
in the benchmark case. In other words, corruption affects the growth rate
of the economy because it induces to a suboptimal level of decentralization.
This explains why in table 4 corruption is not significant when included in the
regression with the share of subnational expenditure. At the same time, we
showed that the existence of potential corruption does not affect the optimal
tax rate.
4.3.4 The Effects of Corruption on the Composition and the Amount
of Public Spending
In our model, the possibility of corruption is summarized by a single param-
eter, φ, that decreases to the level of 1 as the effectiveness of monitoring
increases. A more corrupt local government (high φ) implies both a bias
towards excessive direct provision of the public good by the central govern-
ment, and an overall under-provision of the public good with respect to the
level that would be optimal without corruption. In fact, with perfect mon-
itoring technology (φ = 1) equations (8a) and (11) would yield λ = 1 and
g/y = α, respectively, which is the familiar ”optimal size of government”
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result of the Barro model. As for the ratio between central and local govern-
ment provision of the public good, from the internal solution of equation (7)
we have
gc
gl
= φ−
√
φψ
which can be seen to be decreasing in φ. As the corruption loss increases
(φ→ ∞), gl tends to zero, and the production of the public good is carried
on by the less efficient central government. Conversely, as φ decreases, the use
of gc decreases, and goes to zero for ψ ≥ φ. Our model provides an alternative
mechanism to explain why the Decentralization Theorem may fail to apply,
even absent the spillovers. Of course, the possibility of corruption and rent
seeking is not the only mechanism that may cause an insufficient degree of
decentralization. For example, Hoyt (1991) develops an intuition already
present in Oates (1972), showing how competition for the tax base by local
governments yields insufficient fiscal revenues and public investment. On a
different note, Besley and Coate (2003) build a model in which departures
from Oates’ optimal balance arise from conflicts of interest between citizens
of different jurisdictions. In our setting the balance between local and central
provision of the public good is distorted not because of the interaction of local
governments, but because of the principal-agent relationship between central
and local authorities.
5 Conclusion
The simple model presented in this paper shows that the existence of poten-
tially corrupt local bureaucrats reduces the scope for fiscal decentralization,
and yields an overall insufficient level of productive public goods. Our theo-
retical and empirical results are particularly interesting when we relate them
to the recent empirical literature on growth, corruption and decentralization.
We already mentioned several studies (Zhang and Zou 1998; Jin, Qian,
and Weingast 2005) of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
growth in the Chinese provinces, whose conclusions could be explained by a
mechanism highlighted in our model. In particular, Jin, Qian, and Weingast
(2005) show that the positive effects of decentralization on growth critically
rely on designing a good system of fiscal incentives for local governments
aimed at avoiding rent-seeking: “decentralization of authority is meaning-
less if the central government takes away all revenue generated in the local
economy as a result of local government’s action” (Jin, Qian, and Weingast
2005, p. 1124). In terms of the model parameters, this corresponds to imple-
menting decentralization only when a sufficiently good monitoring technology
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(high δ) is in place, so that the corruption loss φ is minimized. As we men-
tioned, Zhuravskaya (2000), Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) and (Jin, Qian,
and Weingast 2005), argue that insufficient control of local bureaucrats by
the central government was the main reason why the decentralization process
in Russia was much less successful than in China. In both countries decen-
tralization took place, which in our model would correspond to the case of
φ ≤ ψ. Nevertheless, this happened in Russia for high levels of φ and ψ,
so that transfer of power to local governments generated higher rent-seeking
and lower growth than in China, where corruption loss φ was kept low by
maintaining strong party control of provincial and community leaders.
Our paper may also help look in a different way at the literature on de-
centralization and corruption. A recent article by Fisman and Gatti (2002)
makes a thorough empirical analysis of this issue by looking at the cross-
country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as mea-
sured by a number of different indices. They find, as we do, an inverse rela-
tionship between fiscal decentralization and corruption. Our paper suggests,
however, that this analysis should be extended to yield robust conclusions
on the direction of causality, as in fact, within our setting it would be the
extent of corruption that determines the degree of decentralization chosen by
the central government, and not vice versa. Finally, using a cross-section of
15 European countries, Cassette and Paty (2010) showed that greater fiscal
decentralization leads to higher aggregate public expenditure which also fits
with our model, as a particular low-corruption scenario.
The paper leaves, nevertheless, a number of questions unanswered. The
main one is whether multiple equilibria may potentially arise, caused by
the interaction between the extent of corruption, the growth rate, and the
monitoring capacities of the government. Our model could be modified to
yield such multiple equilibria, similar in spirit to those of the already cited
work by Blackburn, Bose, and Haque (2006). This question is left for future
work.
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Table 1: Description of Variables
Name Label Description Source
Corrupt Corruption 10 minus the Transparency
International index, average
over 1997-2002
Transparency
International
GDP2001 GDP in 2001 Gross domestic product for
the year 2001
World Bank
SubnatExp Decentralization Share of subnational expen-
diture, average over 1997-
2002
World Bank
GovtDebt Government Debt Government Debt as a per-
centage of GDP, average
over 1997-2002
World Bank
Open Openness Share of exports and im-
ports in GDP, average over
1997-2002
World Bank
Pop Population Population in millions, aver-
age over 1997-2002
World Bank
Elf85
Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization
Index of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization for the
year 1985
Roeder (2001)
Feder Federation Dummy variable taking the
value of one if a country is a
constitutional federation
Enikolopov
and Zhu-
ravskaya
(2007)
DemAge Democracy Age Number of years since the
beginning of the last demo-
cratic regime for the year
1997
Constructed
based on data
in Enikolopov
and Zhu-
ravskaya
(2007)
LO Legal Origin Legal origin of the country’s
commercial law
La Porta,
Lopez-de
Silanes,
Shleifer, and
Vishny (1999)
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Table 2: Decentralization and Corruption. Full Sample
Dependent variable: Subnational Expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 37.15∗∗ 31.65∗∗ 39.52∗∗
(8.30) (7.22) (8.65)
Corrupt -1.651∗∗ -1.323∗∗ -1.693∗∗
(-2.81) (-2.40) (-2.26)
Pop 2.64e-08∗∗ 2.24e-08∗∗ 2.14e-08∗∗
(3.64) (3.41) (3.64)
Open -0.0674∗∗ -0.0519∗ -0.0641∗∗
(-2.10) (-1.77) (-2.33)
Feder 10.36∗∗ 12.86∗∗
(3.19) (4.02)
Elf85 5.006 14.12∗∗
(0.83) (2.36)
DemAge -0.115∗∗ -0.0632
(-2.14) (-1.28)
LO English -14.51∗∗
(-2.59)
LO French -16.21∗∗
(-2.98)
LO German -6.497
(-1.01)
LO Socialist -4.488
(-0.73)
N 62 62 62
Adj. R2 0.279 0.428 0.558
t -statistics in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 3: Decentralization and Corruption: The OECD Countries
Dependent variable: Subnational Expenditure
(1’) (2’) (3’)
Intercept 36.79∗∗ 35.39∗∗ 36.97∗∗
(6.58) (6.78) (6.85)
Corrupt -3.133∗∗ -3.090∗∗ -2.670∗∗
(-3.07) (-3.03) (-2.39)
Pop 8.15e-08∗ 4.46e-08 5.28e-08
(1.97) (1.15) (1.38)
Open -0.0427 -0.0234 -0.0260
(-1.00) (-0.61) (-0.71)
Feder 15.90∗∗ 15.86∗∗
(3.38) (3.06)
Elf85 -13.60 -4.594
(-1.41) (-0.44)
DemAge -0.0703 -0.102
(-0.39) (-0.56)
LO English -6.460
(-1.17)
LO French -10.77∗∗
(-2.44)
LO German -3.457
(-0.57)
N 31 31 31
Adj. R2 0.309 0.491 0.549
t -statistics in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
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Table 4: Growth and Corruption
Dependent variable: Per capita GDP Growth 2002-2007
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.0568∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0493∗∗
(4.72) (5.14) (2.29)
Open 0.000176∗∗∗ 0.000130∗∗ 0.000178∗∗∗
(3.18) (2.49) (3.35)
GDP2001 -0.00146∗∗∗ -0.00114∗∗∗ -0.00104∗∗∗
(-8.24) (-3.22) (-3.08)
GovtDebt -0.000283∗∗∗ -0.000366∗∗∗ -0.000301∗∗∗
(-3.07) (-4.02) (-3.34)
SubnatExp 0.000662∗∗ 0.000608∗∗
(2.70) (2.37)
Corrupt -0.00895∗ -0.00473
(-1.93) (-1.00)
Corrupt2 0.00124∗∗ 0.000866∗
(2.43) (1.71)
N 43 43 43
Adj. R2 0.667 0.653 0.691
t -statistics in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Appendix
A Solving for the Optimal Shares of Local
and Central Government
Consider again our initial problem:
min
gl,gc
θ = φgl + gc s.t. g =
√
(
gc
ψ
+ g)gl
Define
x =
gc
ψ
+ g
Then
gl =
g2
x
(A1)
gc = (x− g)ψ
Our problem becomes
min
x
φg2
x
+ (x− g)ψ s.t. g = const.
The first order condition is
−φg
2
x2
+ ψ = 0
which yields
x =
√
φ
ψ
g
This can be substituted back into (A1) to obtain the solution in the text:
gc = (x− g)ψ =
(√
φψ − ψ
)
g
gl =
g2
x
=
√
ψ
φ
g
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B Government Shares and λ-value with a Generic
Production Function
The ad-hoc formulation for public good production that we chose in the text
is not necessary to yield our results. Let’s consider a generic production
function for the public good
g = f(gc, gl),
and define fl = ∂g/∂gl, and fc = ∂g/∂gc.The cost minimization problem
becomes,
min (θl + θc) = φgl + gc s.t.
g = f(gc, gl)
which yields the following standard solution:
φ =
fl
fc
For any production function with convex isoquants, an increase in the cor-
ruption loss will imply, via an increase of the marginal rate of technical sub-
stitution, an increase of the ratio gc/gl, and a reduction of total production
g.
If for example we take a Cobb-Douglas production function, g = gψc g
1−ψ
l ,
we can compute
gc
gl
=
ψ
1− ψφ
that is increasing in the relative productivity of gc, ψ, and in the corruption
loss φ. As in the text, the total amount of taxes collected θ is
θ = θl + θc = φgl + gc = λg
where
λ =
(
1− ψ
ψ
)ψ
φ(1−ψ) +
(
ψφ
(1− ψ)
)1−ψ
=
φ1−ψ
ψ1−ψψψ
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All the terms in the denominator are smaller than one, so that we can
conclude that λ > 1. With a Cobb-Douglas production function, inefficiency
and corruption yield the same qualitative results we had in the text, namely
g/y < α and a bias towards gc.
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